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Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
There is a reading of ( 1  a) which can be paraphrased as in ( 1 b) .  The standard account 
of this would attribute the covariation to his being interpreted as a bound individual 
variable, perhaps with the aid of a lambda-abstractor in the syntax as in ( I c) (Heim 
and Kratzer 1 998).  
( 1 )  a. Every man beats his donkey. 
b. For all x such that x is a man, x beats x 's  donkey. 
c .  every man A1 [t1 beats his1 donkey] 
Quantification over individuals seems to be all we need to capture the covariation 
in ( 1 a) .  
I t  has been proposed within the framework of situation semantics (Kratzer 
1989) that there can also be quantification over situations.  The most convincing case 
is that of quantificational adverbs (Berman 1 987, Heim 1 990, von Fintel 1 994)-1 
will be assuming in this paper that the correct analysis of these will often involve 
treating them as quantifiers over situations, sometimes with an if-clause providing 
a restrictor. However, this raises the general question of when exactly we have 
quantification over situations. In particular, do normal quantifiers like every ever 
quantify over situations? If so, do every and the others always quantify over situa­
tions? 
In the next section of this paper I will give two arguments that quantifiers 
like every must at least occasionally quantify over situations. Then I will tum my 
attention to the second question above and argue that there are some configurations 
in which they must not be allowed to do this .  I should point out before we go 
any further, however, that this paper presupposes some sympathy with the project 
of explaining donkey sentences and similar instances of anaphora by means of E­
type pronouns and situation semantics (Heim 1 990), and that proponents of DRT 
analyses will not be moved by the arguments in Section 2 ;  there will, however, be a 
novel argument against DRT in Section 4.4. 1 
2. Does every ever quantify over situations? 
2. 1 .  Sage plant sentences 
Heim ( 1 990: 1 59-64) argues that in the analysis of (2) using the E-type analysis 
or its descendants, it is necessary to quantify over situation variables in addition to 
individual variables . 
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(2) Every woman who bought a sage plant here bought eight others along with 
it. 
A straightforward E-type analysis would have it here mean "the unique sage plant 
bought by x" (for every woman x), and runs into trouble because the meaning of 
the sentence makes it clear that there is no such unique sage plant for every woman 
- in fact, every woman bought nine sage plants. 
The difficulty can be averted, however, if we neutralize this unwelcome 
uniqueness presupposition by relativizing it to small situations .  In particular, let 
us assume (as in Elbourne 200 1 )  that rules for quantifiers like every in situation 
semantics look like (3) (a simplification of the suggestion in Heim 1 990) . 
(3) [ [ [every81 a]82 ,B] ]g = True iff, for every pair of an individual x and a 
minimal situation 81 such that x E [a]g 81 \8 1 , there is a situation 82 such that 
81 � 82 and x E [,B]g 8, \81 , 82 \82 • 
Situation variables will be part of the object language. Every predicate will have 
an additional argument slot for a situation variable: so for example [woman] = 
[AS .  AX . x is a woman in s] . Quantificational structures work by having all the 
situation variables in the restrictor be 81 and at least some of the situation variables 
in the nuclear scope be 82 ; there can also be situation variables 81  in the nuclear 
scope, but no others .2 
Applying (3) to (2) necessitates the (simplified) LF (4)3 , where material 
struck through is deleted at PF, and produces th� truth conditions in (5) .  
(4) [ [every81 [woman(sl)  [whol [a sage-plant(sl ) A2 [tl bought(s l )  t2] ] ] ] ]82 
bought-eight-other-sage-plants(s2) along with [it sag@ plant(sd]] 
(5) For every pair of an individual x and a minimal situation 81  such that x is  a 
woman in 81 and there is a y such that y is a sage plant in 81  and x bought y 
in 81 , there is a situation 82 such that 8 1  � 82 and x bought eight other sage 
plants in 82 along with the unique z such that z is a sage plant in 81 • 
These truth conditions are intuitively correct. But to achieve them, every must 
quantify over situations. 
2 .2 .  Strict and sloppy identity with donkey anaphora 
A previously unnoted argument in favor of every quantifying over situations can be 
constructed on the basis of (6), which I have discussed elsewhere in another context 
(Elbourne 200 1 ) . 
(6) Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey. 
Intuitively, this sentence has the same truth conditions as its more celebrated variant 
(7) .  
(7) Every man who owns a donkey beats it. 
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We are now faced with the task of accounting for this reading. The fact that there 
is covariation implies binding of some kind. And we have two choices: individual 
variables or situation variables . 
How, then, could we attempt to capture the meaning of (6) by means of 
bound individual variables? We must presumably add an individual variable some­
where in the definite description and have it bound by the subject QP. Just adding 
an individual variable is not going to be good enough, however, since every man 
who owns a donkey can only consistently bind variables that range over men who 
own donkeys ;  we do not want to end up with truth conditions like, "For all x such 
that x is a man who owns a donkey, x beats the donkey (identical to) x." What 
we want is something more like, "x beats the donkey owned by x." We are forced, 
then, to make some part of the definite description, plausibly the definite article, 
into something very similar to a Cooper-style donkey-pronoun (Cooper 1 979) . We 
add a variable R that will be assigned as its value some contextually salient rela­
tion, in this case something like [.Ax . .Ay . y is owned by x] ; the pro sister of R will 
be bound by the (lambda-abstractor below the) subject, as we see in (8). 
(8) [every man who owns a donkey] .A2 [t2 beats [ [the [R(7, (e ,et ) ) pro2] ]  donkey] ]  
( I  here follow the simplified version of  Cooper 1979 suggested by Heim and Kratzer 
1 998 .) We just need a revised lexical entry for the definite article (9), allowing it 
to deal with its covert Cooper-style restrictor as well as its overt NP argument, and 
then we are ready to go: we obtain the truth conditions in ( 1 0) for (6), via the LF 
(8) . 
(9) .A!(e,t) . .Ag(e,t ) : :3 !x (f (x) = 1 & g (x) = 1 ) . I.,x (f (x) = 1 & g (x) = 1 ) 
( 10) . For all x such that x is a man who owns donkey, x beats the unique y such 
that y is owned by x and y is a donkey. 
This is rather stipulative, of course, but it seems to do the job. 
Unfortunately, there is a serious empirical objection to this  line of attack, 
which, as far as I can see, would extend to any approach in which the definite 
description is converted into something bindable by the subject QP by means of 
an individual variable. That is that the VP ends up meaning something like '.Ax. x 
beats the donkey owned by x' or '.Ax. x beats the donkey of x' . This is a problem 
because we then predict that a continuation sentence with a type e subject and VP­
ellipsis (or a downstressed VP) will have a sloppy reading. We do not need to 
commit ourselves to any particular theory of VP-ellipsis in order to see this .  We 
only have to observe that a sloppy reading is available in ( 1 1 ), where the VP spells 
out as closely as possible in words the VP-meaning we end up with for (6) under 
the analysis being considered. 
( 1 1 )  a. In this town, every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey he owns, 
and the priest does too. (strict, sloppy) 
b. In this town, every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey he owns, 
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and the priest beats the donkey he owns too. (strict, sloppy) 
Whatever mechanism allows the sloppy reading in ( 1 1 )  would also allow one in 
( 1 2), under the assumption that the overt VPs in ( 1 2) have the same meaning as the 
overt VPs in ( 1 1 ), which is the hypothesis under consideration. We do not in fact 
obtain sloppy readings in ( 1 2), however. 
( 1 2) a. In this town, every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey, and the 
priest does too.  (strict, *sloppy) 
b. In this town, every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey, and the 
priest beats the donkey too. (strict, *sloppy) 
These sentences only have a reading in which the priest beats the donkeys of the 
farmers. There is no reading in which the priest has a donkey and beats it. The 
analysis of (6) by means of bound individual variables makes a prediction that is 
straightforwardly wrong, therefore. 
Let us now construct an analysis of (6) that relies on bound situation vari­
ables. We can use the rule for every that we saw above in (3) .  Applying (3) to (6), 
we end up with the LF ( 1 3) and the truth conditions ( 1 4) .  
( 1 3) [ [everys1 [man(sl )  [who1 [a donkey(sl) A2 [t1 owns(sl)  t2 ] ] ] ] ]S2 beats(s2) the 
donkey(sl)] 
( 1 4) For every pair of an individual x and a minimal situation 8 1  such that x is a 
man in 81 and there is a y such that y is a donkey in 81  and x owns y in 81 , 
there is a situation 82 such that 81 � 82 and x beats in 82 the unique z such 
that z is a donkey in 81 • 
Note how a covarying reading is achieved for the donkey solely by means of situa­
tion variables. 
How does this deal with the obligatory strict reading in ( 1 2)?  The right 
results would be achieved if we could have an LF in which every farmer who owns 
a donkey QRs out to bind into the second conjunct, as in ( 1 6) overleaf. For such LF 
violations of the Co-ordinate Structure Constraint, see Ruys 1 993 ,  where it is shown 
that the CSC can be violated by QPs in the first conjunct when there is a variable in 
the second that can be bound by them. For example, ( 1 5b) has a reading in which 
every professor outscopes some student and binds him; contrast ( 1 5 a),  where, in the 
absence of a bindable variable in the second conjunct, every professor cannot have 
scope above some student. 
( 1 5) a. Some student likes every professor and hates the Dean . 
b. Some student likes every professor and wants him to be on his commit­
tee. 
In ( 1 6) ,  analogously, I propose that the QP subject of the first conjunct can scope 
out, since the situation variables in the second conjunct can thus be bound - a 
natural extension of Ruys's generalization. Further evidence for the possibility of 
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( 1 6) 
the priest(s2) beats(s2 ) 
the donkey(s l )  
something like ( 1 6) comes from the variant of our sentence in ( 1 7) .  
( 1 7) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey, and his wife does too. 
Here, every farmer . . .  binds his, which means it must be binding into the second 
conjunct.4 
Given ( 1 6),  then, we can apply our rule (3) and obtain the truth conditions 
in ( 1 8) .  
( 1 8) For every pair of an individual x and a minimal situation 8 1  such that x is a 
farmer in 81 and there is a y such that y is a donkey in 81 and x owns y in 8 1 , 
there is a situation 82 such that 81 :::; 82 and x beats in 82 the unique z such 
that z is a donkey iri 8 1 and the unique u such that u is a priest in 82 beats in 
82 the unique v such that v is a donkey in 8 1 • 
The correct strict reading is obtained, and there is no evident way to produce a 
sloppy reading in this system, in accordance with the data. The covariance is 
achieved in ( 1 6) by the situation variable 81 on the donkey being bound. The only 
other possibility for the identity of the situation variable on the donkey, given the 
way we have set up the system, is 82 - we are in the nuclear scope of a quan­
tificational structure, so only 81 and 82 are allowed. If we had 82 on the donkey in 
( 1 6), would the right results still be obtained? Yes, because the situations 82 are 
extensions of the situations 81 • The unique donkey in each situation 82 must be the 
unique donkey in each corresponding situation 81 , since we have already set up the 
situations 81 to contain exactly one donkey each and the situations 81 are part of the 
situations 82 • (If we added another donkey in 82 that was not in 8u one belonging 
to the priest, say, there would no longer be a unique donkey in 82 .) Whichever way 
we do things, then, the priest ends up beating the donkeys of the situations 8 1 , the 
donkeys of the farmers, as desired. 
The right results are obtained, therefore, provided we allow quantifiers like 
every to quantify over situations. 
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3. Does every always quantify over situations? 
Given that we must allow ordinary quantifiers to quantify over situations some of 
the time, we must now ask whether there is any reason to say that they ever do not. 
Even simple cases that do not involve donkey anaphora can, after all ,  be analyzed 
by means of situation semantics rules for quantifiers . I repeat ( 1 a) and (3) as ( 1 9) 
and (20) . Applying (20) to ( 1 9) gives us the truth conditions in (2 1 ), which are 
intuitively correct. 
( 1 9) Every man beats his donkey. 
(20) [ [ [everys1 a]S2 J3] ]g = True iff, for every pair of an individual x and a 
minimal situation 81 such that x E [a]g sl \Sl , there is a situation 82 such that 
81 � 82 and x E [J3]g S, \81 ,  S2 \82 . 
(2 1 )  For every pair of an individual x and a minimal situation 8 1  such that x is 
a man in 81 , there is a situation 82 such that 8 1  � 82 and x beats in 82 the 
unique z such that z is x 's  donkey in 82 , 
Having once admitted the outre possibility of (20), can we ever exclude it? 
There are two conceivable positions which seem worth investigating: 
• Modest Situation Semantics: Quantifiers are systematically ambiguous be­
tween versions quantifying only over individual variables and versions like 
(20) . When there is no need for the situation versions (in some sense to be 
made precise), the individual-only versions have to be used . 
• Shameless Situation Semantics: Quantifiers always quantify over situations, 
as in (20) . 
Modest Situation Semantics, as I conceive it, would not allow the situation seman­
tics version of every to be used in ( 1 9) ,  since the version which quantifies only over 
individuals would do just fine. Shameless Situation Semantics, by definition, would 
apply (20) to simple sentences like ( 1 9) .  
Assuming that situation variables are part of object language representa­
tions, as Heim 1 990 proposed, another question should be raised. If Modest Sit­
uation Semantics is correct, do situation variables vanish when they are not being 
quantified over (which would mean that predicates are systematically ambiguous 
between versions taking situation arguments and versions that do not), or do they 
stick around unbound and refer to large contextually salient situations in which all 
the quantificational action (over individuals) takes place? 
I will not attempt to answer this second question in this paper. I will be 
examining the two rival hypotheses, Modest Situation Semantics and Shameless 
Situation Semantics. The data which will bear on the choice between them concerns 
the behavior of the Japanese pronouns kare 'he '  and kanozyo ' she' ; the relevant 
phenomena will be seen to constitute an argument for Modest Situation Semantics. 
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4. Japanese kare and kanozyo 
4. 1 .  The basic data 
Japanese kare 'he' and kanozyo ' she' can be referential but not bound (Noguchi 
1 997 and much previous literature), as we see in the following examples. 
Although I am not aware that this has been noted before in the literature, 
there seem to be two dialects of Japanese, as far as these words are concerned. The 
first places no restrictions on where kare and kanozyo may be placed with respect 
to coreferential terms; it is exemplified in (22) and (23). 
(22) a. Johni-ga [karei -ga atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
John-NOM he-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
'Johni thinks that hei is intelligent. ' 
b. Maryi-ga [kanozyoi-ga atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
Mary-NOM she-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
'Maryi thinks that shei is intelligent.' 
c . Maryi-ga [Proi atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
Mary-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
'Maryi thinks that shei is intelligent.' 
(23) a. *Daremoi-ga [karei -ga atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
everyone-NOM he-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
'Everyonei thinks that hei is intelligent.' 
b. *Daremo-g3i [kanozyoi-ga atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
everyone-NOM she-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
'Everyonei thinks that shei is intelligent.' 
c . Daremo-g3i [Proi atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
everyone-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
'Everyonei thinks they/re intelligent.' 
Note that (23a) and (23b) are bad on the reading where the pronouns are interpreted 
as bound.5 
The second dialect consists of speakers who also find (22a) and (22b) un­
grammatical, in addition to (23a) and (23b) . When the pronouns are more deeply 
embedded, however, exactly the same pattern emerges with respect to the grammat­
icality of bound and referential readings, as we see in (24) and (25) .  
(24) a .  Johni-ga karei -no musume-no atarasii syasin-o motteiru 
John-NOM he-GEN daughter-GEN new photo-ACC has 
'J ohni has a new photo of hisi daughter.' 
b. Maryi-ga kanozyoi-no musume-no atarasii syasin-o motteiru 
Mary-NOM She-GEN . daughter-GEN new photo-ACC has 
'Maryi has a new photo of heri daughter.' 
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(25) a. *Dono titioya-moi karei -no musume-no atarasii syasin-o motteiru 
which father-even he-GEN daughter-GEN new photO-ACC has 
'Every fatheri has a new photo of hisi daughter.' 
b. *Dono hahaoya-moi kanozyoi-no musume-no atarasii 
which mother-even she-GEN daughter-GEN new 
syasin-o motteiru 
photO-ACC has 
'Every motheri has a new photo of heri daughter.' 
I do not know why there should be the dialectal difference, or exactly what is go­
ing on in the second dialect to make (22a) and (22b) ungrammatical .  I will leave 
these questions aside, however, since the second dialect clearly maintains the basic 
pattern found in the first one: kare and kanozyo cannot be bound, even though min­
imally different sentences where they corefer with a type e lexical item in the place 
of the QP in the bad sentences are fine. 
4.2. Previous accounts 
The bulk of my review and criticism of previous accounts of kare and kanozyo is 
based on the review carried out in Noguchi 1 997, to which readers are referred for 
more details. 
Some syntactic treatments of these facts amount only to restatements of the 
problem. I would include here Katada's ( 1 99 1 )  proposal that kare must be operator­
free and Aoun and Hornstein's  ( 1 992: 5) proposal that, "Kare must be A'-free." 
These statements may well be true, but from them we have learned nothing about 
the nature of kare; we ate left wondering what about it is such that it has to be 
operator-free or A'-free. The same can be said about Montalbetti ' s  treatment of 
kare (Montalbetti 1 984: 1 87), which was to state that, "Overt pronouns cannot have 
formal variables as antecedents ." A formal variable (the term is Higginbotham's) 
is a trace left by a QR'd QP or wh-operator. Again, this is just a restatement of the 
problem. 
Huang ( 1 99 1 )  suggested that kare and kanozyo cannot be bound because of 
competition from the reflexive pronoun: when the reflexive pronoun is possible, 
kare and kanozyo will not be possible. But, as Noguchi points out ( 1 997 : 774-5), 
the reflexive pronoun zibun is subject-oriented, and therefore cannot be used, for 
example, with a dative antecedent: 
(26) a. Mary-ga Johni-ni [karei-ga tensai-da to] it-ta 
Mary-NOM John-DAT he-NOM genius-cop CaMP say-PAST 
'Mary told Johni hei was a genius.' 
b. *Mary-ga Johni-ni [zibuni-ga tensai-da to] it-ta 
Mary-NOM John-DAT self-NOM genius-COP CaMP say-PAST 
'Mary told Johni hei was a genius.' 
Since zibun cannot be used in this configuration, it cannot provide competition for 
kare. So on Huang's account, we predict the following to be good (Noguchi 1 997 : 
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774-5) :  
(27) *Mary-ga dono hitoi-ni-mo [karei -ga tensai-da to] it-ta 
Mary-NOM which person-oAT-even he-NOM genius-cOP CaMP say-PAST 
'Mary told every personi hei was a genius.' 
The example is bad, however, meaning that Huang's account cannot be correct.6 
Hoj i  ( 1 99 1 )  advances the puzzling proposal that kare cannot be bound be­
cause it is a demonstrative. He does not take account of the many examples which 
show that demonstratives can in fact be bound. An example is (28), where no sen­
ator raises at LF and binds that senator. 
(28) Mary talked to no senator before that senator was lobbied. 
More would need to be said to make this a viable explanation? 
Noguchi ( 1 997 : 777) says that kare and kanozyo are nouns, citing the evi­
dence in (29)-(3 1 ) . 
(29) a. tiisai kare 
small he 
b. sinsetuna kanozyo 
kind she 
(30) a. watasi-no kare 
I-GEN he 
'my boyfriend' 
b. anato-no kanozyo 
you-GEN she 
'your girlfriend' 
(3 1 )  a. kono kare 
this he 
'this male person' 
b. ano kanozyo 
that she 
'that female person' 
If something can be modified by an adjective (29) or a determiner (3 1 )  and some­
times mean 'boyfriend' (30), Noguchi says, we have good reason to believe that it 
is a noun. He further maintains the following two theses: nouns cannot be func­
tional items; and, "Binding applies only to functional items" ( 1 997 : 783) .  Thus is 
explained the inability of our words to be bound. 
However, this is open to challenge on three counts. First, it is in fact dubi­
ous to say that kare and kanozyo are nouns, or at least nouns in any normal sense 
of the word. To start with, my informants tell me that, for example, tiisai kare 
(which Noguchi does not translate into grammatical English) means something like 
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'he, who is small ' .  It has the flavor, then, of a normal pronoun being modified by 
a non-restrictive relative clause, and is thus not evidence for kare being a noun at 
all . 8 As for the alleged ability of our words to be the arguments of determiners, this 
seems to be highly restricted: no native speaker I have consulted allows subete-no 
( ' all ' )  kare orfutari-no ( 'two' )  kare, and judgments differ sharply about dono kare­
ga ( 'which . . .  ' )  and dono kare-mo ( 'every . . .  ' ) .  Furthermore, Japanese nouns can 
quite generally be used with no overt determiner and receive an indefinite interpre­
tation ( ' an N' ) ;  but this is completely impossible with kare.  Rather than say that 
they are nouns, then, it seems more plausible to say that kare and kanozyo are ba­
sically pronouns which can be coerced into behaving like nouns in an idiosyncratic 
fashion, as in English locutions like the real me and Is it a he or a she ? Secondly, 
even if our words were nouns, it is simply arbitrary to assert, as Noguchi does, that 
nouns cannot be functional items. The lexical-functional distinction is left vague, 
and Noguchi needs to provide a principled account of it that clearly puts all nouns 
on the lexical side, even nouns which are used as pronouns and which thus seem 
rather 'functional ' .  Thirdly, since binding does not apply to all functional items 
(e.g. not to auxiliaries or complementizers ! ) ,  we still have to appeal to properties of 
individual functional items to determine whether or not they can be bound. So the 
appeal to the lexical-functional distinction looks as if it would end up being irrele­
vant anyway - the individual properties in question, which only some functional 
items possess, could very well account for the differences in bindability between 
words without any mention of the lexical-functional distinction being made. I am 
far from being convinced, then, by the account of Noguchi . 
4 .3 .  A new account 
I present here an outline of a new account, sufficient for the theoretical purposes 
that are my main concern in this paper. 
My basic proposal is the following. There is one type of expression in the 
standard logical languages we use which could be referential, could be applied 
to many people indiscriminately like a pronoun, and yet would not be capable of 
being bound, and that is a bland definite description. I suppose, then, that [kare] = 
(,x male(x), and [kanozyo] = ('x female(x)? 
It might be tempting to object to this idea by pointing out that some definite 
descriptions in natural language can be bound, as we have seen in (28), and as some 
speakers find in (32). 
(32) Mary talked to no senator before the senator was lobbied. 
But such an objection would be misguided. My proposal is not that kare and 
kanozyo have the same semantics as, say, English the male person and the female 
person, but that they mean just something like ' ('x male(x) , and ' ('x female(x) , . 
These latter expressions cannot be bound, because there are no free variables in 
them. Those natural language definite descriptions that can be bound cannot have 
meanings like ' (,x male(x) , . There must also be a (locally) free individual variable 
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that can be bound - in logical terms, something like ' Lx(male(x) & x = y) ' .  (See 
Elbourne forthcoming for an argument about how best this is to be achieved.) 
It might also be objected that I have not shown that it should not be possible 
to add an index to our words, so as to make them bindable. But the burden of proof, 
in my opinion, is firmly with those who would maintain that it should be possible 
to do this .  There is no reason, on general grounds, to suppose that every expression 
of type e can be modified (somehow - the process is seldom given a fully explicit 
syntax and semantics I� with an index so as to make it bindable. It seems more 
likely that being able to host indices is a particular, lexically-specified property of 
some items, perhaps just pronouns (of the normal, non-kare sort) and traces . Some 
empirical evidence: many English speakers find (32) ungrammatical ,  despite being 
able to get bound variable readings quite easily with pronouns ;  so for some people 
it is impossible to add an index (whatever this means) to definite descriptions like 
the senator. There is also, as far as I know, no compelling reason to believe that 
proper names can bear indices. I I There is no more reason to believe that kare and 
kanozyo should be able to bear indices. 
This account, combined with some claims I made earlier, makes a predic­
tion. If I am right to say that kare and kanozyo are bland definite descriptions 
containing no bindable individual variables, and that donkey-anaphoric definite de­
scriptions, as in (6), covary by means of situation variables, not individual variables, 
then kare and kanozyo should have E-type uses. I do not know of anywhere in the 
previous literature on these words where this prediction has been tested. But it turns 
out to be correct, as we see in the following examples . The sentences in (33) are 
acceptable only to the speakers of the first dialect mentioned above, the one that 
allows (22a) and (22b). Those in (34) are acceptable to all .  
(33)  a .  Musuko-ga iru dono hito-mo [kare-ga atama-ga ii to] 
son-NOM exists which person-even he-NOM head-NOM good COMP 
omotte-iru 
think-PRES 
'Every person who has a son thinks he's intelligent.' 
b. Musume-ga iru dono hito-mo [kanozyo-ga atama-ga 
daughter-NOM exists which person-even she-NOM head-NOM 
ii to] omotte-iru 
good COMP think-PRES 
'Every person who has a daughter thinks she's intelligent.' 
(34) a. Musuko-ga iru dono hito-mo kare-no atarasii syasin-o 
son-NOM exists which person-even he-GEN new photO-ACC 
motteiru 
has-PRES 
'Every person who has a son has a new photo of him.' 
WHEN IS SITUATION SEMANTICS ALLOWED? 
b. Musume-ga iru dono hito-mo kanozyo-no atarasii 
daughter-NOM exists which person-even she-GEN new 
syasin-o motteiru 
photO-ACC has-PRES 
'Every person who has a daughter has a new photo of her.' 
The truth conditions of (33a), for example, come out by means of our rule (20) to 
be those in (35) .  
(35) For every pair of an individual x and a minimal situation 8 ].  such that x is  a 
person in 8]. and there is a y such that y is a son in 8]. and x has y in 8].> there 
is a situation 82 such that 8]. � 82 and x thinks-intelligent in 82 the unique z 
such that z is male in 8 ]. . 
There is only one difficulty, namely the mention of a unique male in the situations 
8 ].  (to mean the son), when the person whose son it is, who is also in 8 ]. , might 
also be male. But this difficulty, I think, is easily solved. It has been recognized 
for a while that the felicitous use of definite descriptions often requires clues from 
the context to justify the uniqueness conditions associated with them on both Rus­
sellian and Fregean accounts ; we can after all talk about the table even though we 
know there is more than one table in the world. If speaker and hearer manage to 
arrive at some sufficiently similar narrowing down of the domain of discourse, such 
that within this restricted domain. there is only one table, successful communication 
will take place. I suggestthat esseQtially the same thing can happen with respect 
to situations. When faced with (35), ,and a 'context in which males are not excluded 
from being the people with sons, the hearer seeks to find some way to make sense of . 
the uniqueness presupposition by evaluating the definite description with respect to 
homogeneous sub-parts of the situations 8 1 ' Natural sub-parts to choose would be 
those which include the son but exclude the parent. Why? Well, the sentence cannot 
mean that each person who has a son thinks him- or herself intelligent, because that 
would require a reflexive pronoun. When this impossible option is removed from 
consideration, there is indeed a unique male in each of the situations 8]. , namely the 
son, who is thus picked out with the bland definite description kare. 12  
4.4 .  Excursus - a problemjor DRT 
DRT accounts of donkey anaphora maintain that it is accomplished via unselective 
binding of individual variables. (See van Eijck and Kamp 1 997 for a recent survey.) 
Kare and kanozyo, however, can be donkey pronouns but cannot be, or incorpo-
. 
rate, bound individual variables. This is a counterexample to one of the most basic 
claims of DRT. 
4.5 . A residual problem 
There is, however, a problem remaining for the current approach. If quantifiers can 
quantify over situations, in the way that has been previously suggested, how is it 
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that they cannot do so in the sentences like (23a) and (23b), where no covarying 
reading is available for kare and kanozyo? 
That is to say, given rules like (36), we seem to be predicting that (37) (re­
peated from (23a)) should have the truth conditions in (38) .  
(36) [ [ [every81 a] 82 13] ]g = True iff, for every pair of an individual x and a 
minimal situation Sl such that x E [a]g 8, \81 , there is a situation S2 such that 
Sl � S2 and x E [13]g 8, \8, , 82 \82 . 
(37) *Daremoi-ga ti [karei -ga atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
everyone-NOM he-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
'Everyonei thinks that hei is intelligent.' 
(38) For every pair of an individual x and a minimal situation S l  such that x is a 
person in S l '  there is a situation S2 such that Sl � S2 and x thinks in S2 that 
the unique y such that y is a male person in Sl is intelligent. 
(38), of course, is equivalent to "For all x, x thinks x is intelligent", which is pre­
cisely the reading (37) lacks. 
5. In praise of modesty 
Roughly speaking, it looks like we need to prevent quantification over situations in 
configurations where individual variables could be bound, as in (37), but allow it in 
donkey anaphora configurations, like those in (33) and (34) . This looks like a job 
for Modest Situation Semantics. 
Recall our two rival hypotheses from long ago (Section 3, to be precise) : 
• Modest Situation Semantics: Quantifiers are systematically ambiguous be­
tween versions quantifying only over individual variables and versions like 
(36). When there is no need for the situation versions (in some sense to be 
made precise), the individual-only versions have to be used . 
• Shameless Situation Semantics: Quantifiers always quantify over situations, 
as in (36). 
Shameless Situation Semantics cannot be of any help to us. It says that every always 
quantifies over situations, and hence incorrectly predicts (37) to be good with the 
reading (38). 
Modest Situation Semantics, on the other hand, can spell out 'no need' in 
the above definition with the following principle. 
(39) Economy in Quantification 
No use of the situation semantics variants of quantifiers is permitted when 
an indistinguishable interpretation is yielded by replacing the situation se­
mantics quantifier with the corresponding individual-only quantifier and any 
DPs covalued with the trace of the QP with individual variables bound by 
the QP. 
WHEN IS SITUATION SEMANTICS ALLOWED? 
(I assume that a QP will always have moved, either by QR or from a VP-internal 
subject position ; if this turns out not to be the case in the ordinary run of things, the 
instructions for constructing the comparison LF could easily be amended so as to 
enforce it.) This principle, which is modelled closely on Reinhart's  Rule 1 (Rein­
hart 1 983 ,  Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1 993, Heim 1993, Reinhart 1 997), is arguably 
an economy condition on semantic operations: rules like (36) quantify over both 
individuals and situations, and it is in an obvious sense more economical to quan­
tify just over individuals .  (39) is thus to be compared to Fox's (2000) economy 
conditions on LF operations like Quantifier Raising. 1 3 
To evaluate the use of the situation semantics quantifier in (37), which leads 
to the production of the unavailable truth conditions in (38) ,  Economy in Quantifi­
cation thus instructs us to construct the following minimally different LF (= (23c» , 
where it is to be understood that the individual-only version of the quantifier is used. 
(40) Daremo-g3..j ti fproi atama-ga ii to] omotte-iru 
everyone-NOM head-NOM good COMP think-PRES 
Kare in (37) is covalued with the trace of the QP: the trace of the QP in (37) con­
tributes to (38) the x in "x thinks";  kare, meanwhile, ends up meaning "the unique 
y such that y is a male person in 81 ", which must be identical, for each 8 1 >  to x .  
Therefore in (40) kare is replaced by an individual variable pro bound by the QP. 
The truth conditions yielded by the LF (40) are just "For all x such that x is a per­
son, x thinks x is intelligent." They are identical to those described in (38) .  So by 
(39) the situation semantics quantifier in (37) is not allowed - we have to Use the 
individual-only version of daremo. But kare contains no bindable individual vari­
able. So we correctly arrive at the conclusion that there is no way to get a covarying 
interpretation for kare in this example. 
Now let us evaluate the use of the situation semantics quantifier in a donkey 
anaphora example like (33a), repeated here as (4 1 )  with its truth conditions (35) 
repeated as (42) .  
(4 1 )  Musuko-ga iru dono hito-moi 
son-NOM exists which person-even 
omotte-iru 
think-PRES 
ti [kare-ga atama-ga ii to] 
he-NOM head-NOM good COMP 
'Every person who has a son thinks he's intelligent.' 
(42) For every pair of an individual x and a minimal situation 81 such that x is a 
person in 81 and there is a y such that y is a son in 8 1  and x has y in 81 > there 
is a situation 82 such that 81 ::; 82 and x thinks-intelligent in 82 the unique z 
such that z is male in 8 1 • 
As (39) instructs us, we construct a comparison LF by replacing the situation se­
mantics quantifier with the corresponding individual-only quantifier. We look for 
DPs covalued with the trace of the QP, but in this case there are none: kare does 
not qualify, in contrast to the previous example, since in (42) x and "the unique 
1 65 
1 66 Paul Elbourne 
z such that z is male in 8/' (for each 8 1 )  are not the same, as discussed above. 
The only change in the comparison LF, then, is the change of the quantifier to the 
individual-only version. Now kare has a covarying interpretation in the donkey 
anaphora example (4 1 ) ; but it cannot have such an interpretation in the comparison 
LF, since there are no situation variables being bound and it does not contain any 
bindable individual variables. So the truth conditions of the comparison LF are not 
the same as those of the LF being evaluated, and by (39) the LF being evaluated, 
with the situation semantics quantifier, is grammatical . This is the correct result, of 
course. 
We see, then, that there is clear support for Modest Situation Semantics as 
against its less restrained cousin. 
6. Conclusion 
Normal quantifiers like every sometimes quantify over situations .  But they are 
sometimes prevented from doing so. Quantification over situations is more costly 
than quantification just over individuals and is only resorted to when there is a spe­
cial need for it. In particular, quantification over situations is subject to the demands 
of Modest Situation Semantics and the principle of Economy in Quantification (39). 
Since (39) is an economy condition on semantic operations, we see that 
there is further evidence for taking economy conditions to be active in syntax and 
semantics, as claimed in much work of the past decade. 
At the same time, we have s�en (in Section 4.4) a novel argument against 
DRT, lending support to the assumption underlying this paper, that donkey anaphora 
and related phenomena are to be analyzed by means of situation semantics and some 
variant of the E-type analysis. 
Endnotes 
* 
For valuable comments �n this material I am grateful to Kai von Fintel, Danny 
Fox, Irene Heim and Shigeru Miyagawa (at MIT), to Chris Barker, Daniel Buring, 
Jim Higginbotham, Polly Jacobson, Tanya Reinhart, Barry Schein and Karina Wilk­
inson (at SALT XI), and to two anonymous SALT reviewers . Special thanks to Ken 
Hiraiwa, Shinichiro Ishihara, Shigeru Miyagawa, Shogo Suzuki and an anonymous 
FAJL 3 reviewer for giving me Japanese judgments and helping me construct ex­
amples.  
1 I follow Heim 1990 in believing that DRT was an unnecessary innovation, in 
that the pre-existing E-type analysis could have been fixed up in such a way as to 
(largely) circumvent the objections levelled against it at the time. As for actual ar­
guments against DRT, the most powerful, to my mind, is the existence of certain 
types of sentences involving paycheck pronouns. Consider (i), where the paycheck 
pronoun is in a different sentence from its intuitive antecedent, and (ii), where yet 
another sentence intervenes : 
(i) John gave his paycheck to his mistress. Most people put it in the bank. 
WHEN IS SITUATION SEMANTICS ALLOWED? 
(ii) John gave his paycheck to his mistress. Such is the sad state of morality in 
this day and age ! But most people, I'm glad to say, put it in the bank. 
In limited circumstances, it is even possible to have a paycheck pronoun when there 
is no linguistic antecedent whatsoever, as Polly Jacobson has pointed out (personal 
communication) by means of the following example: 
(iii) (New Brownjaculty member waves paycheck in air and throws interrogative 
glance at Jacobson. )  
Jacobson: Most of u s  put it i n  the Brown Employees '  Credit Union. 
These examples surely cannot be dealt with by the DRT mechanism of unselective 
binding; nor will the frequently invoked strategy of dynamic binding improve mat­
ters . On the other hand, they are easily dealt with by E-type pronouns in one or 
another manifestation. Some friends of DRT (Chierchia 1 992, 1 995) acknowledge 
that E-type pronouns seem necessary to deal with examples like these and advocate 
a mixed system with both DRT and E-type mechanisms; but in terms of theoretical 
parsimony this is the worst of all possible worlds. Since some variant of the E-type 
approach holds out the promise of handling all the relevant data, in stark contrast to 
DRT, we should pursue this unless absolutely forced to do otherwise. See further 
Section 4.4 of the present paper. 
2 'S1 \81 ' indicates the object language situation variable S1 being replaced by the 
corresponding (bold-faced) metalanguage variable. For other technical details, read­
ers are referred to Kratzer 1 989 and Heim 1 990. 
, ' 3 In this LF I use the variant of the E-type analysis proposed in Elboume 200 1 ,  
_ whereby (i) looks like (ii) . at LF : 
(i) Every man who owns a donkey beats it. 
(ii) every man who owns a donkey beats [it donkey] 
The pronoun it has the interpretation of a definite article (Postal 1 966), and the 
NP donkey is deleted in the phonology by NP-deletion, which must be obligatory 
(in English at least) with those definite articles that we call third-person pronouns. 
Thus in (4) we have [it sage plant] . (Note that what appears to be NP-deletion is 
possible in some cases where there is no linguistic antecedent: in the scenario in 
(iii) in Note 1 ,  Polly Jacobson could felicitously have said, "No, I 've not received 
mine yet." There is evidently more to NP-deletion than just deletion of material un­
der LF-identity.) The Elboume 2001 system means we can dispense with a separate 
category of E-type pronouns-E-type anaphora is to be explained solely by the in­
dependently motivated mechanisms of NP-deletion and pronouns being interpreted 
as determiners . 
4 I will not here investigate the possibility of obtaining the relevant reading for ( 1 2) 
by telescoping, largely because I do not know how telescoping works. See Poesio 
and Zucchi 1 992 for a good introduction to this obscure subject. 
5 Sentences in which kare would be bound by a wh-phrase are generally also bad. 
Hoji ( 1 99 1 )  reports that straightforward sentences like 'Who said that Mary hit 
kare?' are ungrammatical on the reading where kare is bound by who. Interest­
ingly, he reports that these sentences improve markedly when the restrictor on the 
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wh-phrase is made to denote smaller and smaller sets : 'Which writer said that Mary 
hit kare?' is better than 'Who said that Mary hit kare? ' ,  and 'Which Nobel Prize­
winning writer said that Mary hit kare?' is pretty much fine. I do not have an 
explanation for this effect. (But neither, I hasten to add, does anyone else. In partic­
ular, Hoji 's  own account makes no semantic sense, since he says that the pronoun in 
these cases can be 'coreferential ' with the wh-phrase.) I speculate that the narrow­
ing of the domain might somehow give an independent motivation for quantification 
over situations, which would make the relevant sentences grammatical according to 
the theory I give below. 
6 One could also suggest that there is competition between kare/kanozyo and pro, 
in that kare and kanozyo are not possible when the null pronoun is possible. But 
this would predict that (22b) was bad, given the possibility of (22c) . See Noguchi 's 
article ( 1 997 : 774) for another argument against this hypothesis. 
7 Although it is not essential for the current argument, it may be interesting to note 
at this juncture that even this, which is a demonstrative that is sometimes claimed to 
be unbindable, can in fact be bound if one takes the trouble to construct an example 
in which its proximal semantics is not inappropriate. (i) seems to work pretty well . 
(i) Mary talked to no senator without declaring that this was the one who would 
co-sponsor her bill .  
It was suggested to me at SALT XI that if kare is a demonstrative then perhaps the 
distal/proximal aspect to its semantics might explain its inability to be bound. But 
this does not explain the contrasts attested: for example, there is no difference be­
tween the relationship that holds between John and himself in (22a), "John thinks 
that he's intelligent", and that which holds between each male person and himself in 
(23a), "Everyone thinks he's  intelligent." But (22a) is good (in the relevant dialect) 
and (23a) is bad. 
8 I do not mean to imply that the predicates in tiisai kare and so on actually are 
non-restrictive relative clauses. They could just be similar uses of adjectives. Irene 
Heim (personal communication) alerts me to the possible parallel of English ex­
pressions like poor me, poor John. 
9 Actually things are not quite this simple, since these pronouns are also subject to 
constraints based on social standing. Noguchi ( 1 997 : 778) reports that one does not 
use them to refer to young children or to adults of higher social status. I abstract 
away from this here. We must also suppose that these expressions are like ordinary 
pronouns, and unlike some other definite descriptions, in that they are not subject to 
Condition C of the binding theory. This poses no problems, if only because no-one 
knows why anything should be subject to Condition C of the binding theory. 
l O Is an index combined with a pronoun by Merge (or whatever we call the normal 
operation that takes two lexical items and conjoins them in the syntax)? If not, what 
does the job? If so, why do people not care about type compatibility between the 
items, as they do in all other cases of Merge? Is an index a lexical item of the nor­
mal kind? If so then we are owed an explicit account of its semantic type. If not, 
what is it? For my own view on these matters, see Elbourne forthcoming. 
WHEN IS SITUATION SEMANTICS ALLOWED? 
1 1  But see Heim 1 993 for a system which requires this .  
1 2 The approach sketched here is reminiscent of that suggested to deal with 'bishop 
sentences ' by Heim ( 1 990: 1 57-8). I will not here attempt to see whether or not the 
two come to the same thing. I would like to record, though, that I believe that Heim 
probably is too harsh towards her solution in her i 990 article. More work needs to 
be done on this. 
1 3 Some have objected to (39) on the grounds that it involves comparing derivations .  
I find these objections odd, since I take the work of Reinhart and Fox cited in this 
paragraph to indicate that language often works this way. I suspect that the root of 
the unease is a worry about how this principle would be implemented in accounts 
of production and processing. There are two possible responses here. Reinhart 
(personal communication) says that rules or principles which involve comparing 
derivations should be associated with increased processing difficulty or other psy­
cholinguistic effects indicative of inherent complexity, just as her Rule I was shown 
to be put into effect by children later, developmentally speaking, than Conditions 
A and B (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1 993); the comparison of derivations actually 
happens in real time processing and production, then. The other possible response 
is the Chomsky an one: as theoretical linguists, our job is not, in the first instance, 
to construct models of processing and production, but rather to produce explicit 
algorithms that will correctly pair sound and meaning; these can be expected to 
form the basis of models of processing and production, but not necessarily without 
changes and the addition of other principles and heuristics .  The choice between 
these two responses is actu,ally an empirical fI1at�er: if psycholinguistic effects of . 
the sort Reinhart would predict come to iight, all very well and good; if not, we 
simply conclude that the implementation of the principle in processing and produc­
tion is not straightforward. I do not feel it is unjustified, then, to present a principle 
whose implementation in processing and production models is for the moment ob­
scure. 
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